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Abstract
Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can
collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A
fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single out the most desirable outcomes in terms
of appropriate notions of worth distributions, which are usually called solution concepts. Moti-
vated by the fact that decisions taken by realistic players cannot involve unbounded resources,
recent computer science literature reconsidered the definition of such concepts by advocating
the relevance of assessing the amount of resources needed for their computation in terms of
their computational complexity. By following this avenue of research, the paper provides a
complete picture of the complexity issues arising with three prominent solution concepts for
coalitional games with transferable utility, namely, the core, the kernel, and the bargaining set,
whenever the game worth-function is represented in some reasonable compact form (otherwise,
if the worths of all coalitions are explicitly listed, the input sizes are so large that complex-
ity problems are—artificially—trivial). The starting investigation point is the setting of graph
games, about which various open questions were stated in the literature. The paper gives an
answer to these questions, and in addition provides new insights on the setting, by character-
izing the computational complexity of the three concepts in some relevant generalizations and
specializations.
1 Introduction
Coalitional games have been introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1] to characterize
stable payoff distributions in scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order
to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A coalitional game (with transferable utility)
can abstractly be modelled as a pair G = 〈N, v〉, where N is a finite set of players, and where v
is a function associating with each coalition S ⊆ N a certain worth v(S) ∈ R that players in S
may obtain by collaborating with each other. The outcome of G is an imputation, i.e., a vector of
payoffs (xi)i∈N meant to specify the distribution of the total worth v(N) granted to each player in
N . Imputations are required to be efficient, i.e.,
∑
i∈N xi = v(N), and individually rational, i.e.,
xi ≥ v({i}), for each i ∈ N . In the following, the set of all imputations of G is denoted by X(G).
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It is easily seen that, for any given coalitional game G, the set X(G) might even contain infinitely
many payoff vectors. In this context, a fundamental problem is to single out the most desirable ones
in terms of appropriate notions of worth distributions, which are usually called solution concepts.
Traditionally, this question has been studied in economics and game theory in the light of providing
arguments and counterarguments about why such proposals are reasonable mathematical renderings
of the intuitive concepts of fairness and stability. For instance, well-known and widely-accepted
solution concepts are the Shapely value, the core, the kernel, the bargaining set, and the nucleolus
(see, e.g., [2]). Each solution concept defines a set of outcomes that are referred to with the name
of the underlying concept—e.g., the “core of a game” is the set of those outcomes satisfying the
conditions associated with the concept of core.
More recently, Deng and Papadimitriou [3] reconsidered the definition of solution concepts for
coalitional games from a computer science perspective, by arguing that decisions taken by realistic
agents cannot involve unbounded resources to support reasoning [3, 4], and by suggesting to formally
capture the bounded rationality principle by assessing the amount of resources needed to compute
solution concepts in terms of their computational complexity [3, 5]. In particular, it has been
pointed out that such questions related to the complexity of solution concepts are of particular
interest whenever worth functions are encoded in some succinct way, e.g., they are given in terms
of polynomially computable functions [3]. Indeed, under the na¨ıve perspective of explicitly listing
all associations of coalitions with their worths, the exponential blow-up of the input representation
(w.r.t. the number of involved players) would hide the intrinsic complexity of the solutions concepts.
Coalitional games whose worth functions are encoded without necessarily listing all coalition worths
are called compact games. In fact, inspired by the approach of Deng and Papadimitriou [3], the
computational complexity of various solution concepts over different classes of compact games has
intensively been studied in the last few years (see, e.g., [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]).
In this paper, we continue along the line of research initiated by Deng and Papadimitriou, by
analyzing the computational complexity of three prominent solutions concepts (the core, the kernel,
and the bargaining set) over classes of compact games. Before illustrating our contribution, we next
provide details on the classes of games considered in the paper and overview the relevant related
literature.
1.1 Compactly Specified Games: Graph Games and Marginal Contribution
Nets
Graph Games. The setting of graph games is precisely the one analyzed by Deng and Papadim-
itriou [3]. In graph games, worths for coalitions over a set N of players are defined based on a
weighted undirected graph G = 〈(N,E), w〉, whose nodes in N correspond to the players, and
where the list w encodes the edge weighting function, so that w(e) ∈ R is the weight associated
with the edge e ∈ E. Then, the worth of an arbitrary coalition S ⊆ N is defined as the sum of the
weights associated with the edges contained in S, i.e., as the value v(S) =
∑
e∈E|e⊆S w(e).
Example 1.1. Consider the graph game in Figure 1 formed by the players in {a, b, c, d}. There, the
coalition {a, b} gets a worth v({a, b}) = 2, while the coalition {a, b, d} gets a worth v({a, b, d}) =
3 + 2 − 1 = 4. Note that the graph encodes 24 coalition worths, via 5 weights only. In such a
representation, O(n2) weights succinctly encode the 2n coalition worths, where n is the number of
players. ⊳
Within the setting of graph games, Deng and Papadimitriou [3] characterized the intrinsic
complexity of various tasks, mainly focusing on problems related to the core. For instance, they
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Figure 1: The graph game in Example 1.1.
showed that checking whether the core is non-empty and that checking whether a payoff vector
belongs to the core are co-NP-complete problems. Moreover, they provided a polynomial-time
computable closed-form characterization for the Shapely value, and showed that this value coincides
with the (pre)nucleolus. And, finally, they completed the picture of the complexity issues arising
with graph games by showing the NP-hardness of deciding whether a payoff vector belongs to the
bargaining set and by conjecturing the following two results on graph games:
(C1) Deciding whether a payoff vector belongs to the bargaining set is ΠP
2
-complete; and
(C2) Deciding whether a payoff vector belongs to the kernel is NP-hard.
Marginal Contribution Nets. A class of compact games that received considerable attention
in the last few years is that of (games encoded via) marginal contribution networks, proposed by
Ieong and Shoham [6]. A marginal contribution network (short: MC-net) is constituted by a set
of rules, each one having the form: {pattern} → value, where a pattern is a conjunction that may
include both positive and negative literals, with each literal denoting a player, and value is the
additive contribution associated with this pattern. A rule is said to apply to a coalition S if all
the players whose literals occur positively in the pattern belong to S, and all the players whose
literals occur negatively in the pattern do not belong to S. When more than one rule applies to a
coalition, the value for that coalition is given by the contribution of all those rules, i.e., by the sum
of their values. If no rule applies, then the value for the coalition is set to zero, by default.
Example 1.2. Consider the following marginal contribution network inclunding the following three
rules {a ∧ b} → 5, {b} → 2, and {a ∧ ¬b} → 3, over the players in {a, b}.
The network defines a coalitional game such that: v({a}) = 3 (the third rule applies), v({b}) = 2
(the second rule applies), and v({a, b}) = 5 + 2 = 7 (both the first and the second rules apply, but
not the third one). ⊳
The “structure” of player interactions in MC-nets is represented via their associated agent
graphs [6]. The agent graph associated with an MC-net is the undirected graph whose nodes are
the players of the game, and where for each rule {pattern} → value, the subgraph induced over
the players occurring together in pattern is a clique, weighted by value.
For any graph game G = 〈(N,E), w〉, there is an equivalent MC-net representation having the
same size, and whose “structure” is preserved in that its associated agent graph coincides with
G. Indeed, given any game specified via the graph G = 〈(N,E), w〉, we can just create the rule
{i ∧ j} → w(e), for each edge e = {i, j} ∈ E (cf. [6]). However, the converse is not true, since
MC-nets allow to express any arbitrary coalitional game, while graph games are not fully expressive.
For instance, graph games cannot model a scenario where a group of agents S has value of 1 if, and
only if, |S| > |N |/2 (see [6], for details on the expressiveness of the frameworks).
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In the light of the above observations, hardness results for graph games immediately hold over
marginal contribution networks. For instance, checking whether a payoff vector is in the core and
checking whether the core is non-empty are co-NP-hard problems on MC-nets. Symmetrically,
membership results for MC-nets also hold for graph games, even when they are established over
some “structurally” restricted classes of games (because the structure is preserved). For instance,
on marginal contribution networks associated with acyclic agent graphs or, more generally, with
agent graphs having bounded treewidth [11], Ieong and Shoham [6] showed that deciding whether
a payoff vector is in the core and deciding the non-emptiness of the core are feasible in polynomial
time; therefore, these feasibility results immediately apply to graph games.
Moreover, Ieong and Shoham [6] proved that checking whether a payoff vector is in the core of
a game encoded via marginal contribution networks is in co-NP (as for the class of graph games).
However, they left as an intriguing open problem the following (which, in fact, does not follow from
the corresponding result on graph games):
(O1) Is the problem of deciding core non-emptiness over MC-nets feasible in co-NP?
Indeed, they observed that the “obvious” certificate of non-emptiness of the core based on the
Bondareva-Shapley theorem is exponential in size. Thus, it cannot help deriving the corresponding
membership in co-NP. And, in fact, different technical machineries have to be used for facing the
question.
1.2 Contributions
In this paper, we analyze the computational complexity of the core, the kernel, and the bargaining
set over graph games and marginal contribution networks. In particular, we show that conjectures
(C1) and (C2) by Deng and Papadimitriou are correct, and we provide a positive answer to
question (O1) by Ieong and Shoham. In detail , as our main technical contributions, we show
that:
◮ On graph games, checking whether a payoff vector is in the kernel is NP-hard, and actually
∆P
2
-complete;
◮ On graph games, checking whether a payoff vector is in the bargaining set is ΠP
2
-complete;
and,
◮ On marginal contribution networks, checking whether the core is non-empty is feasible in
co-NP.
These main achievements come, however, not alone in the research reported in the paper.
Indeed, we go beyond and study the computational issues arising in relevant generalizations and
specializations of the setting of graph games.
Generalizations: We consider an abstraction of compact coalitional games that is based on as-
suming that the worth function is provided as an oracle operating over some given structure
encoding the game. In particular, we analyze the cases where each oracle call requires de-
terministic and non-deterministic polynomial time (w.r.t. the size of the game), respectively;
that is, the cases where the oracle encodes a function in FP or in NPSV, respectively. As
an example, graph games and marginal contribution networks are just two instances of the
former setting. Instead, NPSV oracles are much more powerful, since they can be used to
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Problem Graph Games MC-nets General
Core-Check co-NP-complete‡ [3] co-NP-complete‡ [6] co-NP-complete
Core-NonEmptiness co-NP-complete‡ [3] co-NP-complete‡,⋆ co-NP-complete
Kernel-Check ∆P
2
-complete‡ ∆P
2
-complete ∆P
2
-complete
BargainingSet-Check ΠP
2
-complete ΠP
2
-complete ΠP
2
-complete
Figure 2: Summary of results. Hardness results on checking problems hold even if the payoff vector
is actually an imputation. ‡Feasible in polynomial time on structures having bounded treewidth.
⋆Hardness and feasibility in polynomial time on structures having bounded treewidth are shown in
[6].
encode games where coalition worths are the result of complex algorithmic procedures, such
as scheduling, planning or routing activities.
Within this abstract setting, we show that nothing has to be paid for the succinctness of the
specifications, since all the membership results that hold for graph games also hold for any
such class as of compact games. Notably and surprisingly, this is true not only for games
whose worth functions can be computed by a deterministic polynomial-time oracle, but even
for the cases where NPSV oracles are used. Indeed, we show that:
◮ On games defined via non-deterministic polynomial time oracles, the problems of check-
ing whether a payoff vector belongs to the core, the kernel, and the bargaining set are
(still) feasible in co-NP, ∆P
2
, ΠP
2
, respectively; and
◮ On games defined via non-deterministic polynomial time oracles, checking whether the
core is non-empty is (still) feasible in co-NP.
Specializations: Finally, by following the perspective adopted by Ieong and Shoham [6], we ana-
lyze the complexity of the kernel in “structurally restricted” graph games. In particular, we
show that this concept can be expressed in terms of an optimization problem over Monadic
Second Order Logic (MSO) formulae. Based on this encoding and by exploiting Courcelle’s
Theorem [12] and its generalization to optimization problems due to Arnborg, Lagergren, and
Seese [13], we show that:
◮ On graph games having bounded treewidth, checking whether a payoff vector is in the
kernel is feasible in polynomial time (w.r.t. the size of the game measured as the number
of its nodes, plus the number of its edges, plus all the values of the weights associated
with it—or, equivalently, plus the number of the bits necessary to store such weights in
unary notation).
A summary of our results is reported in Figure 2, where Core-Check, Kernel-Check, and
BargainingSet-Check denote the problem of checking whether a payoff vector belongs to the
core, the kernel, and the bargaining set, respectively, and where Core-NonEmptiness denotes the
problem of checking core non-emptiness—in fact, recall that kernel and bargaining set are always
not empty (unless there is no imputation at all) [2], and hence the corresponding non-emptiness
problem is immaterial for them.
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries on computational complexity are
reported in Section 2. An abstract framework for compact games is discussed in detail in Section 3.
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The complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining set is analyzed in Sections 4, 5, and 6, respectively.
Eventually, a few final remarks and discussions on some open problems are reported in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries on Computational Complexity
In this section we recall some basic definitions about complexity theory, by referring the reader to
the work of Johnson [14] for more on this.
2.1 The Complexity of Decision Problems: P, NP, and co-NP
Decision problems are maps from strings (encoding the input instance over a fixed alphabet, e.g.,
the binary alphabet {0, 1}) to the set {“yes”, “no”}. The class P is the set of decision problems
that can be solved by a deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time with respect to the input
size, that is, with respect to the length of the string that encodes the input instance. For a given
input x, its size is usually denoted by ||x||.
Throughout the paper, we shall often refer to computations done by non-deterministic Turing
machines, too. Recall that these are Turing machines that, at some points of the computation,
may not have one single next action to perform, but a choice between several possible next actions.
A non-deterministic Turing machine answers a decision problem if, on any input x, (i) there is at
least one sequence of choices leading to halt in an accepting state if x is a “yes” instance (such a
sequence is called accepting computation path); and (ii) all possible sequences of choices lead to a
rejecting state if x is a “no” instance.
The class of decision problems that can be solved by non-deterministic Turing machines in
polynomial time is denoted by NP. Problems in NP enjoy a remarkable property: any “yes”
instance x has a certificate of it being a “yes” instance, which has polynomial length and which
can be checked in polynomial time (in the size ||x||). As an example, deciding whether a Boolean
formula Φ over the variables X1, . . . ,Xn is satisfiable, i.e., deciding whether there exists some truth
assignment to the variables making Φ true, is a well-known problem in NP; in fact, any satisfying
truth assignment for Φ is obviously a certificate that Φ is a “yes” instance, i.e., that Φ is satisfiable.
The class of problems whose complementary problems are in NP is denoted by co-NP. As an
example, the problem of deciding whether a Boolean formula Φ is not satisfiable is in co-NP. Of
course, the class P is contained in both NP and co-NP.
2.2 Further Complexity Classes: The Polynomial Hierarchy
Throughout the paper, we shall also refer to a type of computation called computation with oracles.
Intuitively, oracles are subroutines which are supposed to have unary cost.
The classes ΣP
k
, ΠP
k
, and ∆P
k
, forming the polynomial hierarchy, are defined as follows: ΣP
0
=
ΠP
0
= P and for all k ≥ 1, ΣP
k
= NPΣ
P
k−1 , ∆P
k
= PΣ
P
k−1 , and ΠP
k
= co-ΣP
k
where co-ΣP
k
denotes the class of problems whose complementary problem is solvable in ΣP
k
. Here, ΣP
k
(resp.,
∆P
k
) models computability by a non-deterministic (resp., deterministic) polynomial-time Turing
machine that may use an oracle in ΣP
k−1
. Note that ΣP
1
coincides withNP, and that ΠP
1
coincides
with co-NP.
A well-known problem at the k-th level of the polynomial hierarchy is deciding the validity of
a quantified Boolean formula with k quantifier alternations. A quantified Boolean formula (short:
QBF) with k quantifier alternations has the form Q1X¯1Q2X¯2...QkX¯kΦ, where k ≥ 1, X¯i (1 ≤ i ≤ k)
is a set of variables, Qi ∈ {∃,∀} (1 ≤ i ≤ k), Qi 6= Qi+1 (1 ≤ i < k), and Φ is a Boolean formula over
the variables in
⋃k
i=1 X¯i. The set of all quantified Boolean formulas with k quantifier alternations
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and Q1 = ∃ (resp., Q1 = ∀) is denoted by QBFk,∃ (resp., QBFk,∀). Deciding the validity of a
quantified Boolean formula in QBFk,∃ (resp., QBFk,∀) is a well-known problem in Σ
P
k
(resp., ΠP
k
).
Note that for k = 1, this problem coincides with the problem of deciding whether the Boolean
formula Φ is satisfiable (resp., not satisfiable), which is indeed in NP (resp., co-NP).
2.3 Reductions among Decision Problems
A decision problem A1 is polynomially reducible to a decision problem A2, denoted by A1 ≤p A2,
if there is a polynomial time computable function h (called reduction) such that, for every x, h(x)
is defined and x is a “yes” instance of A1 if, and only if, h(x) is a “yes” instance of A2. A decision
problem A is complete for a class C of the polynomial hierarchy (at any level k ≥ 1, i.e., beyond
P) if A belongs to C and every problem in C is polynomially reducible to A. Thus, problems that
are complete for C are the most difficult problems in C.
It is worthwhile observing that all problems mentioned in this section are known to be complete
for the classes in which their membership has been pointed out. In particular, deciding the va-
lidity of a QBFk,∃ (resp., QBFk,∀) formula is the prototypical Σ
P
k
-complete (resp., ΠP
k
-complete)
problem.
2.4 Complexity Classes of Functions
All the aforementioned problems are decision ones, but very often we are interested in search prob-
lems where, for any given instance, a (non-Boolean) solution must be computed. The complexity
classes of functions allow us to distinguish such problems according to their intrinsic difficulties,
which is particularly relevant when their associated decision problems belong to the same complex-
ity class.
Let a finite alphabet Σ with at least two elements be given. A (partial) multivalued (MV)
function f : Σ∗ 7→ Σ∗ associates no, one or several outcomes (results) with each input string. Let
f(x) stand for the set of possible results of f on an input string x; thus, we write y ∈ f(x) if y is a
value of f on the input string x. Define dom(f) = {x | ∃y(y ∈ f(x))} and graph(f) = {〈x, y〉 | x ∈
dom(f), y ∈ f(x)}. If x 6∈dom(f), we will say that f is undefined at x. The function f is total if
dom(f) = Σ∗.
An MV function f is polynomially balanced if, for each x, the size of each result in f(x) is
polynomially bounded in the size of x.
The classNPMV is defined as the set of all MV functions f such that both (i) f is polynomially
balanced and (ii) graph(f) is in NP. By analogy, the class NPMVg is defined as the class of all
polynomially-balanced multivalued functions f for which graph(f) is in P. If we deal with (partial)
single-valued functions, we get the corresponding classes NPSV and NPSVg, respectively [15].
A transducer is a (possibly, non-deterministic) Turing machine T on the alphabet Σ with a
read-only input tape, a read-write work tape, and a write-only output tape. For any string x ∈ Σ∗,
we say that T accepts x if T has an accepting computation-path on x. For each x ∈ Σ∗ accepted
by T , we denote by T (x) the set of all strings that are written by T on the output tape in its
accepting computation-paths on input string x. Thus, every transducer is associated with some
MV function f (we say that T computes f) such that, for each x ∈ Σ∗, f(x) = T (x) if x is accepted
by T ; otherwise, f is undefined at x (i.e., x 6∈ dom(f)).
Note that the class FP consists of all functions that are computed by deterministic Turing
transducers in polynomial time.
Functions in NPMV are characterized in terms of Turing machines as follows.
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Fact 2.1. An MV function is in NPMV if and only if it is computed by a nondeterministic
transducer in polynomial time.
It is worthwhile noting the difference between the two classes NPMVg and NPMV, which
contains more complex functions than NPMVg (assuming P 6= NP). For instance, consider the
problem of computing the partial MV function fH that, given a graph G, outputs the Hamiltonian
cycles of G (if any). This function is in NPMVg since graph(fH) is polynomially balanced and
decidable in deterministic polynomial time (for any pair 〈G,C〉, just check whether C is a Hamil-
tonian cycle of G). Let us consider now the weighted version of this problem, where the input
graph G is edge-weighted, and the function values are the weights of Hamiltonian cycles of G (if
any). Then, this partial MV function, say fWH , belongs to NPMV but not to NPMVg (unless
P = NP). Indeed, deciding whether a given pair 〈G,w〉 (graph,weight) belongs to graph(fWH)
is clearly NP-complete (one needs some Hamiltonian cycle having weight w to recognize it as a
correct function value).
3 A Formal Framework for Compact Representations
Graph games and marginal contribution networks are two prominent examples of coalitional games
whose worth functions are defined in terms of some suitable (combinatorial) structure, instead of
listing the worths of all coalitions. In this section, we generalize these two schemes by formalizing
the notion of compact representation for coalitional games.
Any compact representation R defines suitable encodings for a set of coalitional games, denoted
by C(R). If all games may be represented byR, we say that this representation is complete. For any
game G ∈ C(R), R defines an encoding ξR(G) of the game, and a worth function vR(·, ·) that, given
ξR(G) and a set S of players of G, outputs the worth vR(ξR(G), S) associated with the coalition S
according to G.
For instance, consider the graph-games representation GG: any game G ∈ C(GG) is encoded as
a weighted graph ξGG(G), and the worth function vGG(ξGG(G), S) is computed for every coalition S
by taking the sum of the weights of all edges of ξGG(G) included in S.
For the case of the marginal-contribution nets compact-representation MCN , any game G is
encoded by a set of rules ξMCN (G), and the worth-function vMCN (ξMCN (G), S) computes the worth
of S as the sum of the values of those rules fired by players in S.
Definition 3.1. We say that R is a polynomial-time compact representation (short: P-represen-
tation) if the worth-function vR(·, ·) belongs to FP, i.e., it is polynomial-time computable by a
deterministic transducer.
We say that R is a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation (short: NP-rep-
resentation) if the worth-function vR(·, ·) belongs to NPSV, i.e., it is polynomial-time computable
by a non-deterministic transducer. 
Note that both GG and MCN are based on worth functions that are efficiently computable,
and in fact both of them are polynomial-time compact representations.
An interesting feature of a compact representation is its expressive power. Firstly, one may
ask whether R is complete or not, that is, whether it is the case that every coalitional game
belongs to C(R). For instance MCN is a complete representation, while GG is not. However, as a
consequence of completeness, for some gamesMCN is not able to provide succinct representations.
In fact, it is known that there are games whose MCN encodings have size exponential in the
number of players [16]. Therefore, for a pair of compact representations R1 and R2, one may
wonder about the relationship between C(R1) and C(R2), and about the ability to represent games
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in a more o less succinct way. Formally, we say that R2 is at least as expressive (and succinct)
as R1, denoted by R1 -e R2, if there exists a function f in FP that translates a game ξ
R1(G)
represented in R1 into an equivalent game ξ
R2(G) represented in R2, that is, into a game with the
same worth function as the former one. More precisely, we require that, for ξR2(G) = f(ξR1(G)),
vR1(ξR1(G), S) = vR2(ξR2(G), S), for each coalition of players S in the game G.
For instance, it can easily be shown that GG -e MCN . In the rest of the paper, we shall
provide complexity results for GG, MCN , and for arbitrary P and NP compact representations.
For the sake of presentation, whenever a compact representation R is understood, we just write
G instead of ξR(G), and v(S) instead of vR(ξR(G), S).
4 The Complexity of the Core
The concept of the core goes back to the work of Edgeworth [17] and it has been formalized by
Gillies [18]. To review its definition, we need to state some preliminary concepts and notations,
which will extensively be used throughout the paper.
For any coalition S ⊆ N , let |S| denote the cardinality of S, and let RS be the |S|-dimensional
real coordinate space, whose coordinates are labeled by the members of S; in particular, given a
payoff vector x ∈ RS , xi denotes the component associated with the player i ∈ S. A vector x ∈ R
S
is called an S-feasible vector if
∑
i∈S xi = v(S). The value
∑
i∈S xi will be simply denoted by x(S)
in the following. Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a coalitional game, and let x be an imputation taken from the
set X(G) of all imputations of G—recall from the Introduction that such an x must be efficient,
i.e.,
∑
i∈N xi = v(N), and individually rational, i.e., xi ≥ v({i}), for each i ∈ N . The pair (y, S) is
an objection to x if y is an S-feasible payoff vector such that yk > xk for all k ∈ S.
Definition 4.1. The core C (G) of a coalitional game G = 〈N, v〉 is the set of all imputations x to
which there is no objection; that is,
C (G) =
{
x ∈ X(G)
∣∣∄S ⊆ N and y ∈ RS such that y(S) = v(S) and yk > xk,∀k ∈ S} .

Thus, an imputation x in the core is “stable” precisely because there is no coalition whose
members will receive a higher payoff than in x by leaving the grand-coalition.
It is easily seen that Definition 4.1 can be equivalently restated as the set of all solutions
satisfying the following inequalities [see, e.g., 2]:
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N ∧ S 6= ∅ (1)
∑
i∈N
xi ≤ v(N). (2)
In particular, the last inequality, combined with its opposite in (1), enforces the efficiency of
solutions; moreover, inequalities in (1) over singleton coalitions enforce their individual rationality.
Example 4.2. Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a TU game with N = {a, b, c}, v({a}) = v({b}) = v({c}) = 0,
v({a, b}) = 20, v({a, c}) = 30, v({b, c}) = 40, and v({a, b, c}) = 42. Consider the imputation x
such that: xa = 4, xb = 14, and xc = 24. Since v({b, c}) = 40 > 38 = x({b, c}) such imputation x
is not in C (G).
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In fact, we can show that C (G) is empty. To this end, consider coalitions S1 = {a, b}, S2 = {a, c}
and S3 = {b, c} and the worths associated with them by the worth function. An imputation x to
be in C (G) have to satisfy the following three conditions:
xa + xb ≥ 20
xa + xc ≥ 30
xb + xc ≥ 40.
Summing up these inequalities we obtain that 2xa+2xb+2xc ≥ 90, implying that xa+xb+xc ≥ 45.
Thus, the core of G is empty because the grand-coalition would need to receive 45 instead of
v(N) = 42 in order to satisfy the claims of S1, S2 and S3.
Consider, instead, the game G′ = 〈N, v′〉 whose worth function v′ is the same as that of G except
for the grand-coalition for which v′(N) = 45. Then, it is easily checked that the imputation x′ such
that x′a = 5, x
′
b = 15, and x
′
c = 25 is in C (G
′). ⊳
As it emerged from the above example, the core of a game can be empty. In fact, checking
whether this is not the case is a co-NP-hard problem for graph games [3]. It is easy to see that this
hardness result can be extended easily to all compact game representations at least as expressive
(and succinct) as graph games.
Proposition 4.3. Let R be any compact representation such that GG -e R (e.g., R = MCN ).
On the class C(R), Core-NonEmptiness is co-NP-hard.
Proof. From the co-NP-hardness for graph games [3], we know that there is a polynomial-time
reduction f1 from any co-NP problem Υ to the core non-emptiness problem for graph games.
Moreover, recall from Section 3 that GG -e R means that there exists a polynomial-time function
f2 that translates any graph game ξ
GG(G) into an equivalent game f2(ξ
GG(G)) belonging to C(R),
that is, into a game with the same worth function and thus the same core as the former one.
Therefore, the composition of f1 and f2 is a polynomial-time reduction from Υ to the core non-
emptiness problem for games in C(R).
In fact, for the case of graph games, the precise complexity of the non-emptiness problem for
the core is known, as Deng and Papadimitriou [3] have shown that this problem is co-NP-complete.
However, it was open whether the membership still holds for marginal contribution networks [6]
and, possibly, for more general compact representations. In this section, we positively answer this
question and show that in fact membership in co-NP holds for any class of games C(R) associated
with an NP representation scheme R.
In order to get this result, we have to identify some succinct certificate that the core of a game
is empty. Indeed, it was observed that the “obvious” certificate of non-emptiness of the core based
on the Bondareva-Shapley theorem is exponential in size [6]. The technical machinery that we need
is originally due to Helly, who proved the following beautiful result on families of convex sets.
Proposition 4.4 (Helly’s Theorem [19, 20]). Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be a finite family of convex sets
in Rn, where m > n. If
⋂m
i=1 ci = ∅, there is a set C
′ ⊆ C, such that |C′| = n+1 and
⋂
ci∈C′
ci = ∅.
However, we next provide a direct proof of the existence of such succinct certificates of in-
feasibility. Indeed, we believe that our proof provides a nice geometrical interpretation of Helly’s
Theorem for the convex sets related with the core, and thus it may be of independent interest for
the reader. The approach is based on the well-known fact that, because of inequalities (1) and (2),
the core of a coalitional game over N players is a polyhedral set of RN .
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4.0.1 Preliminaries on Polyhedral Sets
We next give some useful definitions and facts about polyhedral sets. We refer the interested reader
to any text on this subject for further readings (see, e.g., [21, 22]).
Let n > 0 be any natural number. A Polyhedral Set (or Polyhedron) P of Rn is the intersection
of a finite set S of closed halfspaces of Rn. Note that in this paper we always assume, unless
otherwise stated, that n > 0. We denote this polyhedron by Pol(S).
Recall that a hyperplane H of Rn is a set of points {x ∈ Rn|aTx = b}, where a ∈ Rn and b ∈ R.
The closed halfspace H+ is the set of points {x ∈ Rn|aTx ≥ b}. We say that these points satisfy
H+. We denote the points that do not satisfy this halfspace by H−, i.e., H− = Rn \H+ = {x ∈
Rn|aTx < b}. Note that H− is an open halfspace. We say that H determines H+ and H−. Define
the opposite of H+ as the set of points H¯+ = {x ∈ Rn|a′Tx ≥ b′}, where a′ = −1 ·a and b′ = −1 · b.
Note that H¯+ = H− ∪H, since it is the set of points {x ∈ Rn|aTx ≤ b}.
Let P = Pol(S) be a polyhedron and H a hyperplane. Then, H cuts P if both H+ and H−
contain points of P , and we say that H passes through P , if there is a non-empty touching set
C = H ∩P . Furthermore, we say that H supports P , or that it is a supporting hyperplane for P , if
H does not cut P , but passes through P , i.e., it just touches P , as the only common points of H
and P are those in their intersection C.
Moreover, we say that H+ is a supporting halfspace for P if H is a supporting hyperplane for P
and P ⊆ H+. Note that P ⊆ Pol(S ′) for any set of halfspaces S ′ ⊆ S, since the latter polyhedron is
obtained from the intersection of a smaller set of halfspaces than P . We say that such a polyhedron
is a supporting polyhedron for P .
Recall that, for any set A ⊆ Rn, its dimension dim(A) is the dimension of its affine hull.
For instance, if A consists of two points, or it is a segment, its affine hull is a line and thus
dim(A) = 1. By definition, dim(∅) = −1, while single points have dimension 0. For any hyperplane
H, dim(H) = n− 1, while the intersection C of any pair of (non-parallel) hyperplanes H1 and H2
has dimension n− 2.
Every hyperplaneH has precisely two normal vectors, while its associated halfspace H+ has one
normal vector, that is, the normal vector of H that belongs to H+. The dihedral angle δ(H+1 ,H
+
2 )
between two non-parallel halfspaces H+1 and H
+
2 is the smallest angle between the corresponding
normal vectors. For such halfspaces, in this paper we always consider rotations whose axis is the
(affine) subspace C = H1 ∩H2 of dimension n− 2, so we avoid to explicitly mention rotation axes,
hereafter. Note that such rotations are uniquely identified by their amount (angle) of rotation,
which is the one degree of freedom. Formally, define the result of a rotation of a halfspace H+1
towards a halfspace H+2 of an angle −π < α < π to be the halfspace H
+
3 such that δ(H
+
3 ,H
+
2 ) =
δ(H+1 ,H
+
2 )− α, and Hi ∩Hj = C, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i 6= j (the points on the axis C of rotation are
fixed).
A set F ⊆ P is a face of P if either F = ∅, or F = P , or if there exists a supporting hyperplane
HF of P such that F is their touching set, i.e., F = HF ∩ P . In the latter case, we say that F is a
proper face of P . A facet of P is a proper face of P having the largest possible dimension, that is,
whose dimension is dim(P )− 1.
The following facts are well known [21]:
1. For any facet F of P , there is a halfspace H+ ∈ S such that F = H+ ∩ P . We say that H+
generates F .
2. For any proper face F of P , there is a facet F ′ of P such that F ⊆ F ′.
3. If F and F ′ are two proper faces of P and F ⊂ F ′, then dim(F ) < dim(F ′).
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Figure 3: Rotations of halfspaces in Lemma 4.5.
4.0.2 Separating Polyhedra from a Few Supporting Halfspaces
We start with a pair of technical results. With a little abuse of notation, since coalitions cor-
respond to the inequalities (1) and hence with the associated halfspaces of Rn, we use hereafter
interchangeably these terms.
Lemma 4.5 (Roof Lemma). Let H+1 , H
+
2 , and H
+
3 be three halfspaces such that Hi∩Hj = C 6= ∅,
∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i 6= j, and such that H+3 may be obtained by rotating H
+
1 towards H
+
2 by β < 0, with
δ(H+2 ,H
+
1 )− β < π. Then, H
+
1 is a supporting halfspace for H
+
2 ∩H
+
3 , i.e., for Pol({H
+
2 ,H
+
3 }).
Proof. Note that H+2 may be obtained by rotating H
+
1 towards H
+
2 by their dihedral angle 0 <
α = δ(H+2 ,H
+
1 ) < π. Thus, all points A of H1 \ C that belong to H
+
2 are in H
−
3 , because H3 is
obtained by rotating those points (in the opposite direction) by the angle β < 0. Symmetrically, all
points B of H1 \ C belonging to H
+
3 are in H
−
2 , see Figure 3, for a three-dimensional illustration.
Moreover, observe that all points in H1 \C are involved in the rotations and thus belong to either
A or B. It follows that (H1 \C)∩ (H
+
2 ∩H
+
3 ) = ∅, whence H1 is a supporting hyperplane. Finally,
since δ(H+2 ,H
+
1 )− β < π, it is easy to see that some point in H
+
2 ∩H
+
3 is in H
+
1 , and thus H
+
1 is
in fact a supporting halfspace for Pol({H+2 ,H
+
3 }).
We next show that, whenever a full-dimensional polyhedron P = Pol(S) of Rn is separated from
some hyperplane HP , there exists a subset of at most n halfspaces corresponding to facets of P that
define a larger polyhedron of Rn (a rough approximation of P ), which is still separated from HP .
We first give the proof idea, with the help of Figure 4. For the sake of intuition, imagine that H+P
is the inequality (2) associated with the grand-coalition, while the set S corresponds to the other
inequalities (1), whence in this case the core is empty. If there is a facet F of P that is parallel to
HP , we are trivially done, because its associated halfspace already provides the desired separated
polyhedron, succinctly described by just one inequality. Otherwise such a face F has a smaller
dimension but, from Fact 2, there exists a facet F ′ of P such that F ⊂ F ′. In the three-dimensional
example shown in Figure 4, F is the vertex at the bottom of the diamond, H+F is the halfspace
(anti-)parallel to HP that contains F (but it is not associated with any inequality generating P ),
and F ′ is some facet on its “dark side.” Let C = HF ∩ HF ′, and consider the rotation of H
+
F
towards H+F ′ of a negative angle β (we go on the opposite direction w.r.t. H
+
F ′) that first touches
P , say HF ′′ . As illustrated in Figure 4, where the face F
′′ is an edge of the diamond, F ′′ properly
includes F and its dimension is at least d > dim(F ). From the above lemma, H+F is a supporting
halfspace of the polyhedron Pol(H+F ′,H
+
F ′′), called its roof, which contains P and is separated from
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Figure 4: Construction of a certificate of emptiness for the core.
HP . However, we are not satisfied because we would like that such a polyhedron is described by
(at most n) halfspaces taken from S, and H+F ′′ does not belong to S, in general (as in our example,
where it does not generate a facet of P . Then, we proceed inductively, by observing that H+F ′′ is
a supporting halfspace for Pol(H+
F ′′
1
,H+
F ′′
2
)—its roof, whose faces have higher dimension than F ′′.
In the running example, they are both facets of the diamond, and hence the property immediately
holds. In general, the procedure may continue, encountering each time at least one facet and one
more face with a higher dimension than the current one. The formal proof follows.
Lemma 4.6. Let P = Pol(S) be a polyhedron of Rn with dim(P ) = n, and H+F a supporting
halfspace of P whose touching set is F . Then, there exists a set of halfspaces HF ⊆ S such that
|HF | ≤ n−dim(F ), H
+
F is a supporting halfspace of Pol(HF ), and their touching set C is such that
F ⊆ C.
Proof. The proof is by induction. Base case: If dim(F ) = n − 1 we have that the touching face
F = H+F ∩ P is a facet of P . Thus, from Fact 1, F is generated by some halfspace H
+ ⊆ S such
that H+ ∩P = F , as for HF . Since dim(F ) = dim(H) = dim(HF ) = n− 1, it easily follows that in
fact H = HF holds. Thus, H
+
F is trivially a supporting halfspace of H
+, and this case is proved:
just take HF = {H
+} and note that |HF | = 1.
Inductive step: By the induction hypothesis, the property holds for any supporting halfspace
H+F ′ of P such that its touching face F
′ has a dimension d ≤ dim(F ′) ≤ n − 1, for some d > 0.
We show that it also holds for any supporting halfspace H+F of P , whose touching face F has a
dimension dim(F ) = d− 1.
Since F is not a facet, from Fact 2 there exists a facet F ′ of P such that F ⊂ F ′. Let
C = HF ∩HF ′ , where H
+
F ′ ∈ S is the halfspace that generates the facet F
′. Note that F ⊆ C. Let
H+F ′′ be the halfspace that first touches the polyhedron P obtained by rotating H
+
F towards H
+
F ′
by some negative angle β (i.e., we are going in the opposite direction w.r.t. H+F ′). Then, H
+
F ′′ is a
supporting halfspace of P , and the touching set F ′′ includes C. Since dim(P ) = n, we have that
δ(H+F ,H
+
F ′)− β < π and F ⊂ F
′′ (as the latter face contains some point of the polyhedron outside
the axis C ⊇ F ), and thus the dimension dim(F ′′) of this face is strictly greater than dim(F ),
from Fact 3. Moreover, From Lemma 4.5, H+F is a supporting halfspace of Pol(H
+
F ′ ,H
+
F ′′), with
C = HF ′ ∩HF ′′ as touching set.
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By the induction hypothesis, since both dim(F ′) and dim(F ′′) are at least d, we know that
there are two sets HF ′ ⊆ S and HF ′′ ⊆ S such that: H
+
F ′ is a supporting halfspace of Pol(HF ′),
with F ′ ⊆ C ′, where C ′ is their touching set; and H+F ′′ is a supporting halfspace of Pol(HF ′′), with
F ′′ ⊆ C ′′, where C ′′ is their touching set. In particular, Pol(HF ′) ⊆ H
+
F ′ and Pol(HF ′′) ⊆ H
+
F ′′ ,
respectively. Let HF = HF ′ ∪HF ′′ . Then, we get Pol(HF ) ⊆ Pol({H
+
F ′ ,H
+
F ′′}) ⊆ H
+
F .
Recall that F ⊆ C. Moreover, F ⊂ F ′ and F ⊂ F ′′, and thus F ⊆ (F ′ ∩F ′′) ⊆ (C ′ ∩C ′′), since
F ′ ⊆ C ′ and F ′′ ⊆ C ′′. It follows that the touching set of H+F and Pol(HF ) includes F . Indeed,
this touching set includes (C ′ ∩ C ′′) ∩HF ⊇ (C
′ ∩ C ′′) ∩ (HF ∩HF ′ ∩HF ′′) = (C
′ ∩ C ′′) ∩ C, and
from the above observations (C ′ ∩ C ′′) ∩C ⊇ F .
Finally, note that |HF | ≤ |HF ′ |+ |HF ′′ | = 1+ |HF ′′ |, because dim(F
′) = n−1 and the base case
applies. Moreover, dim(F ′′) > dim(F ) = d − 1 and thus, by the induction hypothesis, we obtain
|HF | ≤ 1 + n− dim(F
′′) ≤ 1 + n− d = n− dim(F ).
Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a game with transferable payoffs. A coalition set S ⊆ 2N is a certificate
of emptiness (or infeasibility certificate) for the core of G if the intersection of Pol(S) with the
grand-coalition halfspace (2) is empty. In fact, this definition is motivated by the following obser-
vation. Let P be the polyhedron of Rn obtained as the intersection of all halfspaces (1). Since S
is a subset of all possible coalitions, P ⊆ Pol(S). Therefore, if the intersection of Pol(S) with the
grand-coalition halfspace (2) is empty, the intersection of this halfspace with P is empty, as well.
Theorem 4.7. Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a game with transferable payoffs. If the core of G is empty, there
is a certificate of emptiness S for it such that |S| ≤ |N |.
Proof. Let n = |N | and P be the polyhedron of Rn obtained as the intersection of all halfspaces
(1). Since we are not considering the feasibility constraint (2), there is no upper-bound on the
values of any variable xi, and thus it is easy to see that P 6= ∅ and dim(P ) = n.
Let H+P be the halfspace defined by the grand-coalition inequality (2). If the core of G is empty,
the whole set of inequalities has no solution, that is, P ∩H+P = ∅.
Let H¯+F be the halfspace parallel to H
+
P that first touches P , that is, the smallest relaxation
of H+P that intersect P . Consider the opposite H
+
F of H¯
+
F , as shown in Figure 4, on the left. By
construction, H+P ∩H
+
F = ∅, HF = H¯F is a supporting hyperplane of P , and H
+
F is a supporting
halfspace of P . Let F be the touching set of HF with P , and let d = dim(F ). In Figure 4, it is the
vertex at the bottom of the diamond P . From Lemma 4.6, there is a set of halfspaces S associated
with inequalities from (1), with |S| ≤ n−d, and such that H+F is a supporting halfspace for Pol(S).
It follows that H+P ∩ Pol(S) = ∅, whence S is a certificate of emptiness for the core of G. Finally,
note that the largest cardinality of S is n, and corresponds to the case dim(F ) = 0, that is, to the
case where the face F is just a vertex. Therefore the maximum cardinality of the certificate is n.
In our three-dimensional example, the certificate is {H+F ′ ,H
+
F ′′
1
,H+
F ′′
2
}, as shown in Figure 4, on the
right.
Note that the above proof is constructive and has a nice geometrical interpretation. Exploiting
the above property, we can now determine the complexity of core non-emptiness for any (non-de-
terministic) polynomial-time compact representation.
Theorem 4.8. Let R be a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation. On the class
C(R), Core-NonEmptiness is feasible in co-NP.
Proof. Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a game with transferable payoffs in C(R). If its core is empty, from
Theorem 4.7, there is a certificate of emptiness S, with |S| ≤ n, where n is the number of players
of G. For the sake of presentation, let us briefly sketch the case of a polynomial-time deterministic
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representation R. In this case, a non-deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time may check
that the core is empty by performing the following operations: (i) guess of the set S, i.e., of
the coalitions of players corresponding to the halfspaces in S; (ii) computation in deterministic
polynomial time of the worth vR(ξR(G), S), for each S ∈ S, and for the grand-coalition N ; and (iii)
check of the property Pol(S) ∩H+P = ∅, where H
+
P is the halfspace defined by the grand-coalition
inequality (2). Note that the last step is feasible in polynomial time, as we have to solve a system
consisting of just n+ 1 linear inequalities.
The case of a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation R is a simple variation
where, at step (ii), for each S ∈ S, the computation of the worth is an NPSV problem, and thus
the machine should work as follows: it guesses the value w = vR(ξR(G), S) and a witness y that
〈(ξR(G), S), w〉 ∈ graph(vR) (which is an NP task in this case); then, by exploiting y, it checks
in (deterministic) polynomial-time that actually 〈(ξR(G), S), w〉 belongs to the graph of the worth
function vR.
The above membership result and Proposition 4.3 imply that the non-emptiness problem for
the core is co-NP-complete for all NP representations at least as expressive as the graph games.
Corollary 4.9. Let R be any non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation such that
GG -e R (e.g., R =MCN ). On the class C(R), Core-NonEmptiness is co-NP-complete.
5 The Complexity of the Kernel
The kernel is a solution concept introduced by Davis and Maschler [23]. Let us start by recalling
its formal definition.
For any pair of players i and j of a coalitional game G = 〈N, v〉, we denote by Ii,j the set
of all coalitions containing player i but not player j. The excess e(S, x) = v(S) − x(S) of the
generic coalition S at the imputation x ∈ X(G) is a measure of the dissatisfaction of S at x.
Define the surplus si,j(x) of player i against player j at an imputation x as the value si,j(x) =
maxS∈Ii,j e(S, x) = maxS∈Ii,j (v(S)− x(S)).
Definition 5.1. The kernel K (G) of a TU game G = 〈N, v〉 is the set:
K (G) = {x ∈ X(G) | si,j(x) > sj,i(x)⇒ xj = v({j}),∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}.

Intuitively, the surplus of player i against j at x is the highest payoff that player i can gain
(or the minimal amount i can lose, if it is a negative value) without the cooperation of j, by
assuming to form coalitions with other players that are satisfied at x; thus, si,j(x) is the weight of
a possible threat of i against j. In particular, player i has more “bargaining power” than j at x
if si,j(x) > sj,i(x); however, player j is immune to such threat whenever xj = v({j}), since in this
case j can obtain v({j}) even by operating on her own. We say that player i outweighs player j at
x if si,j(x) > sj,i(x) and xj > v({j}). The kernel is then the set of all imputations where no player
outweighs another one.
Example 5.2. Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a TU game with N = {a, b, c}, v({a}) = v({b}) = v({c}) = 0,
v({a, b}) = 20, v({a, c}) = 30, v({b, c}) = 40, and v({a, b, c}) = 42.
It is easily verified that the imputation x such that xa = 4, xb = 14, and xc = 24 is in the
kernel of G. Indeed, we note first that every player in N receives in x a payoff strictly greater than
what she is able to obtain by acting on her own. For this reason, in order for x to belong to K (G)
it must be the case that si,j(x) ≤ sj,i(x), for all distinct players i and j. By the definition of the
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Figure 5: The game K(φ̂), where φ̂ = (α1 ∨ ¬α2 ∨ α3) ∧ (¬α1 ∨ α2 ∨ α3).
worth function, the maximum excess that a coalition S including i and excluding j can achieve is
obtained by the coalition S ∈ Ii,j such that |S| = 2. By this, si,j(x) = sj,i(x) = 2 for all pairs of
different players i, j. Thus, x ∈ K (G). ⊳
It is well known that K (G) 6= ∅, whenever X(G) 6= ∅ (see, e.g., [2]). Thus, the non-emptiness
problem is trivial for this concept. Instead, as discussed by Deng and Papadimitriou [3], it is of
interest to ask for the computational complexity of deciding whether a given payoff vector belongs
to the kernel. This problem was conjectured to be NP-hard by those same authors [3], even for
graph games. In the rest of the section, we firstly confirm the conjecture by actually showing that
the problem is even harder and, precisely, ∆P
2
-hard. Then, we shall show that the corresponding
membership result holds on any class of games C(R), where R is an arbitrary NP representation
scheme. Finally, we shall single out an island of tractability, by looking for structural restrictions
imposed over graph games.
5.1 Hardness on Graph Games
We show that checking whether an imputation belongs to the kernel is ∆P
2
-hard on graph games.
The proof is based on a reduction from the problem of the lexicographically maximum satisfying
assignment for Boolean formulae.
Let φ = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cm be a 3CNF Boolean formula, that is, a Boolean formula in conjunctive
normal form over the set {α1, . . . , αn} of variables that are lexicographically ordered (according
to their indices) where each clause contains three literals (positive or negated variables) at most.
Assume, w.l.o.g., that there is a clause in φ containing at least two literals. Based on φ, we build
in polynomial time the weighted graph K(φ) = 〈(N
K
, E
K
), w〉 such that (see Figure 5 for an
illustration):
• The set N
K
of nodes (i.e, players) includes: a variable player αi, for each variable αi in φ; a
clause player cj , for each clause cj in φ; a literal player ℓi,j (either ℓi,j = αi,j or ℓi,j = ¬αi,j),
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for each literal ℓi (ℓi = αi or ℓi = ¬αi, respectively) occurring in cj ; and, two special players
“chall” and “sat”.
• The set E
K
consists of the following three types of edges.
(Positive edges): an edge {cj , ℓi,j} with w({cj , ℓi,j}) = 2n+3, for each literal ℓi occurring in
cj ; an edge {chall, αi} with w({chall, αi}) = 2
i, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n; an edge {sat, αi}
with w({sat, αi}) = 2
i, for each 2 ≤ i ≤ n; the edge {sat, α1} with w({sat, α1}) = 2
1+20.
(“Penalty” edges): an edge {ℓi,j , ℓi′,j} with w({ℓi,j , ℓi′,j}) = −2
m+n+7, for each pair of
literals ℓi and ℓi′ occurring in cj ; an edge {αi,j ,¬αi,j′} with w({αi,j ,¬αi,j′}) = −2
m+n+7,
for each variable αi occurring positively in cj and negated in cj′ ; an edge {αi,¬αi,j} with
w({αi,¬αi,j}) = −2
m+n+7, for each variable αi occurring negated in cj .
(“Normalizer” edge): the edge {chall, sat}, for which we assign the weight w({chall, sat}) =
1−
∑
e∈E
K
|e 6={chall,sat}w(e).
Note that the size of the representation of all the weights is polynomial in the number of
variables and clauses of φ. Two crucial properties of the above construction are stated in the
following lemma.
Lemma 5.3. Let K(φ) = 〈(N
K
, E
K
), w〉 be the graph game associated with the 3CNF formula φ.
Then:
(A) w({chall, sat}) ≥ D + 1; and,
(B) D + w(e) < 0, for each penalty edge e ∈ E
K
,
where D = max{chall,sat}6⊆S⊆N v(S) denotes the maximum worth over all the coalitions not covering
the edge {chall, sat}.
Proof. Let P =
∑
e∈E
K
|e 6={chall,sat},w(e)>0w(e) be the sum of all the positive edges, but the normal-
izer one, in K(φ). Let us firstly observe that:
P ≤ 3×m× 2n+3 + 2×
n∑
i=1
2i + 20 ≤ 2m+n+5 + 2n+2 + 20 ≤ 2m+n+6.
Thus, 2m+n+7 ≥ 2 × P holds. Moreover, observe that K(φ) contains at least one penalty edge,
since w.l.o.g. there is a clause in φ containing at least two literals. Hence, w({chall, sat}) =
1−
∑
e∈E
K
|e 6={chall,sat}w(e) ≥ 1−P+2
m+n+7. It follows that w({chall, sat}) ≥ 1−P+2×P = 1+P .
Eventually, P ≥ D holds by definition of D and, therefore, w({chall, sat}) ≥ 1 +D, which proves
(A).
As for (B), given that D > 0 and P ≥ D, we may note that 2m+n+7 ≥ 2×P implies 2m+n+7 >
D.
Based on the above properties, we can now prove the main result.
Theorem 5.4. On the class C(GG) of graph games, Kernel-Check is ∆P
2
-hard (even if the given
payoff vector is an imputation).
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Proof. Let φ = c1∧· · ·∧ cm be a satisfiable 3CNF formula over a set {α1, . . . , αn} of variables that
are lexicographically ordered (according to their indices). Deciding whether α1 (that is the lexico-
graphically least significant variable) is true in the lexicographically maximum satisfying assignment
for φ is a well-known ∆P
2
-complete problem [24].
Consider the graph game K(φ) = 〈(N
K
, E
K
), w〉, and the imputation x that assigns 0 to all
players of K(φ), but to sat, which receives 1. In fact, x is an imputation since v(N) = 1 because
of the weight of the edge {chall, sat} (recall that w({chall, sat}) = 1−
∑
e∈E
K
|e 6={chall,sat}w(e)).
Beforehand, observe that, by Definition 5.1 and since sat is the only player that receives in
x a payoff strictly greater than her worth as a singleton coalition, x ∈ K (K(φ)) if and only if
maxS∈Ii,sat e(S, x) ≤ maxS∈Isat,i e(S, x), for each player i 6= sat. The following property further
restricts the coalitions of interest and, indeed, suffices to conclude that x ∈ K (K(φ)) if and only
if
max
S∈Ichall,sat
e(S, x) ≤ max
S∈Isat,chall
e(S, x). (3)
Property 5.4.(1): For each player i 6∈ {sat, chall}, maxS∈Ii,sat e(S, x) ≤ maxS∈Isat,i e(S, x).
Let S be an arbitrary coalition in Ii,sat with i 6= chall, and consider the coalition T =
{chall, sat} ∈ Isat,i. Note that e(T, x) = v(T ) − x(T ) = v({chall, sat}) − 1 while e(S, x) =
v(S). By Lemma 5.3.(A), we know that v({chall, sat}) ≥ v(S) + 1. Thus, e(T, x) ≥ e(S, x)
holds for all coalitions S ∈ Ii,sat with i 6= chall.
Now, we are going to characterize the structure of the two terms maxS∈Ichall,sat e(S, x) and
maxS∈Isat,chall e(S, x) occurring in Equation (3) by establishing a connection with satisfying assign-
ments for φ. In particular, for any truth assignment σ, we denote by σ |= φ the fact that σ satisfies
φ, and by σ(αi) = true (resp., σ(αi) = false) the fact that αi evaluates to true (resp., false) in σ.
Property 5.4.(2): maxS∈Ichall,sat e(S, x) = m× 2
n+3 +maxσ|=φ
∑
αi|σ(αi)=true
2i.
Let us firstly note that maxS∈Ichall,sat e(S, x) = maxS∈Ichall,sat v(S), by construction of the
imputation x. Let S∗ be the coalition having maximum worth over all the coalitions in
Ichall,sat. Because of Lemma 5.3.(B) and since v({chall}) = 0, S∗ cannot cover any penalty
edge, for otherwise S∗ would not be a coalition with maximum worth amongst those belonging
to Ichall,sat. Thus, (i) for each variable player αi ∈ S∗, no literal player of the form ¬αi,j is in
S∗; (ii) for each clause player cj ∈ S∗, at most one literal player of the form ℓi,j is in S∗; and,
(iii) for each variable αi, S∗ contains no pair of literal players of the form αi,j and ¬αi,j′.
It follows that the worth of S∗ is such that: v(S∗) = |C| × 2
n+3 +
∑
αi∈S∗
2i, where C is the
set of the clause players cj ∈ S∗ for which exactly one literal player ℓi,j is in S∗; in particular,
recall that 2i is the weight associated with the edge {chall, αi}, while 2
n+3 is the weight
associated with each edge of the form {cj , ℓi,j}. Now, let, σ̂ be a truth assignment such that
σ̂(αi) = true (resp., σ̂(αi) = false) if αi,j (resp., ¬αi,j) occurs in S∗ for some clause cj .
Note that σ̂ may be a partial assignment, over a set of variables α̂ ⊆ {α1, . . . , αn}; however,
because of (iii) above, σ̂ is non-contradictory and satisfies all the clauses whose players are
in C. Eventually, since φ is satisfiable and since 2n+3 >
∑n
i=1 2
i, because of (ii) S∗ will
certainly contain all the m clause players (i.e., σ̂ is a satisfying assignment for φ). That is,
v(S∗) = m× 2
n+3 +
∑
αi∈S∗
2i.
Observe now that if αi,j is in S∗, then αi is in S∗ as well, since this leads to maximize the worth
of S∗. Moreover, if ¬αi,j is in S∗, then αi is not in S∗ because of (i). Thus, the assignment
σS∗ such that σS∗(αi) = true (resp., σS∗(αi) = false) if αi occurs (resp., not occurs) in S∗
coincides with σ̂ when restricted over the domain of the variables in α̂. Therefore, σS∗ is, in
turn, a satisfying assignment, and we have:
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v(S∗) = m× 2
n+3 +
∑
αi|σS∗(αi)=true
2i ≤ m× 2n+3 +max
σ|=φ
∑
αi|σ(αi)=true
2i.
We conclude the proof by showing that the above inequality cannot be strict. Indeed, as-
sume, for the sake of contradiction, that a satisfying assignment σ exists for φ such that
v(S∗) < m× 2
n+3 +
∑
αi|σ(αi)=true
2i. Based on σ, we can build a coalition S such that: (a)
{chall, c1, . . . , cm} ⊆ S; (b) αi ∈ S, for each αi such that σ(αi) = true; (c) exactly one literal
ℓi,j is in S, for each clause cj that is satisfied by ℓi,j according to the truth values defined in
σ; (d) no further player is in S.
Given that σ is a satisfying assignment, no penalty edge is covered by S. In particular, v(S) =
m×2n+3+
∑
αi∈S
2i and, hence, v(S) = m×2n+3+
∑
αi|σ(αi)=true
2i. But, this is not possible
since we would have a coalition S ∈ Ichall,sat such that v(S) > v(S∗) = maxS∈Ichall,sat v(S).
Property 5.4.(3): maxS∈Isat,chall e(S, x) = m×2
n+3+maxσ|=φ(|{α1 | σ(α1) = true}|+
∑
αi|σ(αi)=true
2i)−
1.
The property can be proven precisely along the same line of reasoning as in the proof of
Property 5.4.(2). The differences are that: x(S) = 1 holds for each S with sat ∈ S; and that
the weight associated with the edge {sat, αi} is 2
i, for each 2 ≤ i ≤ n, while it is 21 + 20 for
the case where i = 1. In particular, |{α1 | σ(α1) = true}| precisely encodes the fact that an
unitary weight has to be added to any assignment where α1 evaluates to true.
We can now rewrite Equation (3) in the light of the above two properties, and conclude that
x ∈ K (K(φ)) if and only if:
1 +max
σ|=φ
∑
αi|σ(αi)=true
2i ≤ max
σ|=φ

 ∑
αi|σ(αi)=true
2i + |{α1 | σ(α1) = true}|

 ,
that is, x ∈ K (K(φ)) if and only if α1 is true in the lexicographically maximum satisfying assign-
ment for φ.
By the same argument used in the proof of Proposition 4.3, the above result can be immediately
extended to all representations at least as expressive (and succinct) as graph games.
Corollary 5.5. Let R be any compact representation such that GG -e R (e.g., R = MCN ). On
the class C(R), Kernel-Check is ∆P
2
-hard.
5.2 Membership on FNP Representation Schemes
Differently from the hardness result proven above, the corresponding membership result is routine.
Anyway, the proof is reported below, for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 5.6. Let R be a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation. On the class
C(R), Kernel-Check is feasible in ∆P
2
.
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Proof. Let G ∈ C(R) be a coalitional game, and x be a payoff vector. Note first that, in order to
check whether x is actually an imputation, we have just to compute the worths associated to all
the singleton coalitions plus the worth associated to the whole set of players, which can be done in
∆P
2
—just recall that each worth can be computed in non-deterministic polynomial-time. More in
detail, for each player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we guess in polynomial time the value wi = v
R(ξR(G), {i})
and a suitable certificate c{i}, and then we check in (deterministic) polynomial time that in fact
〈(ξR(G), {i}), wi〉 ∈ graph(v
R), exploiting the certificate c{i} (see the proof of Theorem 4.8).
Assume now that x is an imputation. Then, we observe that for each pair of players i and j, we
can compute the value si,j(x) by means of a binary search over the range of the possible values for
the worth functions, by using an NP oracle. Indeed, for any value h in this range, we can decide
in NP whether there is a coalition S ∈ Ii,j such that e(S, x) > h, by guessing the coalition S,
its worth w = vR(ξR(G), S) together with a (polynomial) certificate cS , and then by checking in
polynomial time that in fact S ∈ Ii,j, that 〈(ξ
R(G), S), w〉 ∈ graph(v) (by exploiting cS), and that
e(S, x) > h, where e(S, x) = w − x(S).
Finally, note that, beingR a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation, vR(·, ·)
is polynomially balanced, meaning that there exists a fixed integer k such that, for every game G
in C(R), ||vR(ξR(G), S)|| ≤ ||〈ξR(G), S〉||k for every coalition S, and hence the worth value of every
coalition in G (of every G ∈ C(R)) cannot exceed the largest (positive or negative) value repre-
sentable in the polynomial size ||〈ξR(G), S〉||k . By this, the above binary search allows us to find
the maximum excess in at most polynomially many steps. Therefore, by using polynomially-many
oracle calls, we may check in polynomial time that for each pair of distinct players i and j such
that xj 6= v({j}), it is the case that si,j(x) ≤ sj,i(x).
From this result and Corollary 5.5, we immediately get the following completeness result.
Corollary 5.7. Let R be any non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation such that
GG -e R (e.g., R =MCN ). On the class C(R), Kernel-Check is ∆
P
2
-complete.
5.3 Tractable Classes of Graph Games
Many NP-hard problems in different application areas ranging, e.g., from AI [25] and Database
Theory [26] to Game theory [27], are known to be efficiently solvable when restricted to instances
whose underlying structures can be modeled via acyclic graphs or nearly-acyclic ones, such as those
graphs having bounded treewidth [11]. Indeed, on these kinds of instances, solutions can usually
be computed via dynamic programming, by incrementally processing the acyclic (hyper)graph,
according to some of its topological orderings. In this section, we shall show that this is also the
case for the kernel of bounded treewidth graph games.
Our result is established by showing that this concept can be expressed in terms of an optimiza-
tion problem over Monadic Second Order Logic (MSO) formulas, and by subsequently applying
Courcelle’s Theorem [12] and its generalization to optimization problems due to Arnborg, Lager-
gren, and Seese [13]. Thus, we first review the concepts of treewidth and MSO, and their relationship
as it appears from Courcelle’s Theorem.
Treewidth. A tree decomposition of a graph G = (N,E) is a pair 〈T, χ〉, where T = (V, F ) is a
tree, and χ is a labeling function assigning to each vertex p ∈ V a set of vertices χ(p) ⊆ N , such
that the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) for each node b of G, there exists p ∈ V such that b ∈ χ(p);
(2) for each edge (b, d) ∈ E, there exists p ∈ V such that {b, d} ⊆ χ(p); and,
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(3) for each node b of G, the set {p ∈ V | b ∈ χ(p)} induces a connected subtree.
The width of 〈T, χ〉 is the number maxp∈V (|χ(p)| − 1). The treewidth of G, denoted by tw(G),
is the minimum width over all its tree decompositions. It is well-known that a graph G is acyclic if
and only if tw(G) = 1. Deciding whether a given graph has treewidth bounded by a fixed natural
number k is known to be feasible in linear time [28].
MSO. Monadic Second Order (MSO) logic formulae over graphs are made up of the logical con-
nectors ∨, ∧, and ¬, the membership relation ∈, the quantifiers ∃ and ∀, vertices variables and
vertex sets variables—in addition, it is often convenient to use symbols like ⊆, ⊂, ∩, ∪, and →
with their usual meaning, as abbreviations.
Courcelle [12] and other authors considered an extension of MSO, called MSO2, where variables
for edge sets are also allowed. The fact that an MSO2 sentence φ holds over a graph G is denoted
by G |= φ.
The relationship between treewidth and MSO2 is illustrated next. For a positive constant k,
let hereafter Ck be a class of graphs having treewidth bounded by k. For a graph G = (N,E), we
denote by ||G|| its size, which is measured as the number of its nodes plus the number of its edges,
i.e., ||G|| = |N |+ |E|
Proposition 5.8 (Courcelle’s Theorem [12]). Let φ be a fixed MSO2 sentence. For each G ∈ Ck,
deciding whether G |= φ or not is feasible in linear time (w.r.t. ||G||).
An important generalization of MSO2 formulae to optimization problems was presented by Arn-
borg et al. [13]. Next, we state a simplified version of these kinds of problems. Optimization prob-
lems are defined over MSO2 formulae containing free variables and over graphs that are weighted
on both nodes and edges.
Let G = 〈(N,E), fN , fE〉 be a weighted graph where fN and fE are the lists of weights associated
with nodes and edges, respectively. Then, fN (v) (resp., fE(e)) denotes the weight associated with
v ∈ N (resp., e ∈ E). For the weighted graph G = 〈(N,E), fN , fE〉, its size ||G|| is measured as the
sum of |N | + |E| plus all values in the lists fN and fE. Note that this is equivalent to state that
weights are encoded in unary notation and that ||G|| is measured as the sum of |N | + |E| plus all
the bits that that are necessary to store the lists fN and fE.
Let φ(X,Y ) be an MSO2 formula over the graph (N,E), where X and Y are the free variables
occurring in φ, with X (resp., Y ) being a vertex (resp., edge) set variable. For a pair of interpre-
tations 〈zN , zE〉 mapping X to subsets of N and Y to subsets of E, we denote by φ[〈zN , zE〉] the
MSO2 formula (without free variables) where X and Y are replaced by the sets zN (X) and zE(Y ),
respectively.
A solution to φ over G is a pair of interpretations 〈zN , zE〉 such that (N,E) |= φ[〈zN , zE〉] holds.
The cost of 〈zN , zE〉 is the value
∑
x∈zN (X)
fN (x) +
∑
y∈zE(Y )
fE(y). A solution of minimum cost
is said optimal.
Theorem 5.9 (simplified from Arnborg et al. [13]). Let φ be a fixed MSO2 sentence. For each
weighted graph G = 〈(N,E), fN , fE〉 such that (N,E) ∈ Ck, computing an optimal solution to φ
over G is feasible in (deterministic) polynomial time (w.r.t. ||G||).
A Tractable Class. Now that we have discussed the preliminary notions and concepts related to
treewidth and MSO, we are in the position of stating our tractability result.
Theorem 5.10. Let G = 〈(N,E), w〉 be a graph game such that (N,E) ∈ Ck, and let x be a payoff
vector. Then, deciding whether x ∈ K (G) is feasible in polynomial time (w.r.t. ||G||).
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Proof. Since we can check in polynomial time whether x is an imputation, by Definition 5.1 we
have just to show that checking whether the condition si,j(x) > sj,i(x) ⇒ xj = v({j}) holds is
feasible in polynomial-time. We prove that si,j(x) may be computed in polynomial time for each
each pair of players i 6= j, which clearly entails the above tractability result.
For each X ⊆ N and Y ⊆ E, consider the following MSO2 formula, stating that Y is the set of
all those edges e ∈ E such that e ⊆ X:
proj(X,Y ) ≡ ∀v, v′
(
{v, v′} ∈ Y → {v, v′} ⊆ X
)
∧
∀v, v′
(
{v, v′} ⊆ X ∧ {v, v′} ∈ E → {v, v′} ∈ Y
)
.
Let wE and wN be such that wE({v, v
′}) = −w({v, v′}) and wN (v) = xv, and observe that
maxS⊆N e(S, x) = −1 ∗ opt, where opt = minS⊆N (x(S) − v(S)) is the cost of an optimal solu-
tion to proj(X,Y ) over 〈(N,E), wN , wE〉.
Recall, now, that si,j(x) = maxS∈Ii,j e(S, x). Therefore, in order to exploit the above MSO
formula for its computation, we have to make sure that the set of considered coalitions is restricted to
Ii,j. We thus modify the weights of i and j in G so that, in any optimal solution of the above formula,
i ∈ X and j /∈ X, and thus maxS⊆N e(S, x) coincides with si,j. Let B = maxe∈E abs(wE(e)) be
the largest weight (in absolute value) among all edges of the graph. Then, replace the weights for
nodes i and j as follows: wN (i) = −1− |{e ∈ E | i ∈ e}| ∗B and wN (j) = 1+ |{e ∈ E | j ∈ e}| ∗B.
It is straightforward to check that any optimal solution for this modified graph is attained at some
set S that includes i and does not include j. From its value, say opt′, we may easily compute the
desired value si,j(x) as −1 ∗ (opt
′ + xi − wN (i)).
Hence, by Theorem 5.9 and the above MSO2 formula, si,j is computable in polynomial time,
and thus the membership of x in K (G) can be decided in polynomial time, too.
6 The Complexity of the Bargaining Set
The concept of bargaining set was defined by Aumann and Maschler [29] (see also Maschler [30]).
We start by recalling its formal definition.
Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a coalitional game, and x ∈ X(G) be an imputation. Let S ⊆ N be a
coalition, and y be an S-feasible payoff vector (i.e., y(S) = v(S)). The pair (y, S) is an objection
of player i against player j to x if i ∈ S, j /∈ S, and yk > xk for all k ∈ S.
A counterobjection to the objection (y, S) of i against j to x is a pair (z, T ) where j ∈ T , i /∈ T ,
and z is a T -feasible payoff vector such that zk ≥ xk for all k ∈ T \S and zk ≥ yk for all k ∈ T ∩S.
If there does not exist any counterobjection to (y, S), we say that (y, S) is a justified objection.
Definition 6.1. The bargaining set B(G) of a TU game G is the set of all imputations x to which
there is no justified objection. 
Example 6.2. Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a TU game with N = {a, b, c}, v({a}) = v({b}) = v({c}) = 0,
v({a, b}) = 20, v({a, c}) = 30, v({b, c}) = 40, and v({a, b, c}) = 42.
Consider the imputation x such that xa = 8, xb = 10, and xc = 24. An objection of player
c against player a to x is ((12, 28), {b, c}). Player a can counterobject to this objection using
((8, 12), {a, b}). Another objection of player c against player a to x is ((14, 26), {b, c}). In this case,
player a cannot counterobject. The reason is that coalition {a, b} receives a payoff 20 and this is
not sufficient for player a to counterobject since she needs at least 8 for herself and at least 14
for player b, in order to respond to the proposal of player c. Therefore the imputation x does not
belong to B(G). The intuitive reason is that player a receives too much, according to this profile.
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Consider now the imputation x′ such that x′a = 4, x
′
b = 14, and x
′
c = 24. We focus on the
objections of player a against player c. We note that, in order to object, player a has to form the
coalition S = {a, b}. The excess e(S, x) of S at x is 2, hence players a and b have the possibility
to distribute among themselves a payoff of 2 to make the objection. But player c can always
counterobject to player a because she can form the coalition T = {b, c} whose excess at x is 2 and
hence she can always match the proposal made to player b by player a in order to object. A similar
argumentation holds for every objection of every player against any other. Thus x′ ∈ B(G). ⊳
It is well-known that K (G) ⊆ B(G) (hence, B(G) 6= ∅, whenever X(G) 6= ∅), and that
C (G) ⊆ B(G) (see, e.g., [2]). Thus, as in the case of the kernel, we shall just focus on the complexity
of deciding whether a given payoff vector is in the bargaining set. The problem was conjectured to
be ΠP
2
-complete for graph games by Deng and Papadimitriou [3]. In this section, we show that the
conjecture is indeed correct. Also, we are able to generalize the result by showing that membership
in ΠP
2
holds on any class of games C(R), where R is an NP representation scheme.
6.1 Hardness on Graph Games
It has been suggested by Maschler [30] that computing the bargaining set might be intrinsically
more complex than computing the core. The result presented in this section provides some fresh
evidence that this is indeed the case inasmuch as we show that the checking whether a payoff vector
is in the bargaining set is ΠP
2
-hard, even over graph games. The reduction is from the validity of
quantified Boolean formulae.
Let Φ = (∀α)(∃β)φ(α,β) be an NQBF2,∀ formula, i.e., a quantified Boolean formula over
the variables α = {α1, . . . , αn} and β = {β1, . . . , βr}, where φ(α,β) = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cm is a 3CNF
formula, and where each universally quantified variable αk ∈ α occurs only in the two clauses
ci(k) = (αk ∨¬βk) and c¯i(k) = (¬αk ∨βk)—intuitively, each variable αk enforces the truth-value of a
corresponding variable βk, which thus plays its role in the formula φ(α,β). Based on Φ, we define
the weighted graph BS(Φ) = 〈(N
BS
, E
BS
), w〉 such that (see Figure 6 for an illustration):
• The set N
BS
of the nodes (i.e., players) includes: a clause player cj, for each clause cj ; a literal
player ℓi,j, for each literal ℓi occurring in cj ; and, two special players “chall” and “sat”.
• The set E
BS
of edges includes three kinds of edges.
(Positive edges): an edge {cj , ℓi,j} with w({cj , ℓi,j}) = 1, for each literal ℓi occurring in the
clause cj ; an edge {chall, ℓi,j} with w({chall, ℓi,j}) = 1, for each literal ℓi of the form αi
or ¬αi (i.e., built over a universally quantified variable) occurring in cj .
(“Penalty” edges): an edge {γi,j,¬γi,j′} with w({γi,j ,¬γi,j′}) = −m−1, for each variable γi
(either γi = αi or γi = βi) occurring in cj and cj′ ; an edge {ℓi,j, ℓi′,j} with w(ℓi,j , ℓi′,j) =
−m − 1, for each pair of literals ℓi and ℓi′ occurring in cj; an edge {chall, ℓi,j} with
w({chall, ℓi,j}) = −m − 1, for each literal ℓi of the form βi or ¬βi (i.e., built over an
existentially quantified variable) occurring in cj; an edge {chall, cj} with w({chall, cj}) =
−m− 1, for each clause cj .
(“Normalizer” edge): the edge {chall, sat} with weight w({chall, sat}) = n − 1 + m −∑
e∈E
BS
|e 6={chall,sat}w(e).
Note that the size of the representation of all the weights is polynomial in the number of variables
and clauses of Φ. Moreover, the following properties hold.
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Figure 6: The game BS(Φ̂), where Φ̂ = (∀α1)(∃β1, β2, β3)(α1 ∨¬β1)∧ (¬α1∨β1)∧ (β1∨β2∨¬β3).
Lemma 6.3. Let BS(Φ) = 〈(N
BS
, E
BS
), w〉 be the graph game associated with the NQBF2,∀
formula Φ. Then:
(A) D ≤ m;
(B) w({chall, sat}) > 2×m;
(C) D + w(e) < 0, for each penalty edge e ∈ E
BS
; and,
(D) m ≥ 2× n,
where D = max{chall,sat}6⊆S⊆N v(S) denotes the maximum worth over all the coalitions not covering
the edge {chall, sat}.
Proof. The fact (A) that D ≤ m is immediate by construction. Moreover, the weight of each
penalty edge is −m − 1 and, hence, (C) holds, too. Eventually, (D) (i.e., m ≥ 2 × n) is also
immediate since Φ is an NQBF2,∀ formula.
Let us, hence, focus on (B) by observing that
∑
e∈E
BS
|e 6={chall,sat}w(e) ≤ −m− 1, for EBS con-
tains more penalty edges than positive ones. Thus, w({chall, sat}) = n−1+m−
∑
e∈E|e 6={chall,sat}w(e) ≥
n− 1 +m+ (m+ 1) > 2×m.
Theorem 6.4. On the class C(GG) of graph games, BargainingSet-Check is ΠP
2
-hard (even if
the given payoff vector is an imputation).
Proof. Deciding the validity of NQBF2,∀ formulae is Π
P
2
-complete [31]. Thus, given an NQBF2,∀
formula Φ = (∀α)(∃β)φ(α,β) (where α = {α1, . . . , αn}, β = {β1, . . . , βr}, and φ(α,β) = c1 ∧
· · · ∧ cm), consider the graph game BS(Φ) = 〈(NBS , EBS), w〉 and the imputation x that assigns
m to sat, n − 1 to chall, and 0 to all other players. Note that x is an imputation, since v(N) =
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m+ n− 1 because of the weight of the edge {chall, sat} (recall that w({chall, sat}) = m+ n− 1−∑
e∈E
BS
|e 6={chall,sat}w(e)).
Beforehand, we note that the following properties hold on BS(Φ) and x.
Property 6.4.(1). No player has a justified objection against a clause or a literal player.
Indeed, any clause player cj receives 0 in x and is such that v({cj}) = 0. Therefore, she
can counterobject to any objection through the singleton coalition {cj}. Similarly, any literal
player ℓi,j receives 0 in x and is such that v({ℓi,j}) = 0, and can counterobject through {ℓi,j}.
Property 6.4.(2). No player has a justified objection against chall.
Assume that a player p ∈ N
BS
wants to object against chall through a coalition S. If v(S) < 0
then p cannot object against anyone. Indeed, she has to propose an S-feasible vector y such
that yk > xk for all player k ∈ S, and hence v(S) = y(S) > x(S), but x(S) ≥ 0 by definition,
so player p cannot fulfill this requirements if v(S) < 0. Then, because of Lemma 6.3.(C), S
does not include penalty edges. In particular, for each universally quantified variable αk, it
holds that |S ∩ {αk,i(k),¬αk,¯i(k)}| ≤ 1, where ci(k) and c¯i(k) are the two clauses where this
variable occurs (recall that Φ is an NQBF2,∀ formula).
Consider, then, the coalition T ⊆ {chall}∪{αk,i(k),¬αk,¯i(k) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n} such that |T | = n+1,
T ∩ S = ∅, and |T ∩ {αk,i(k),¬αk,¯i(k)}| = 1, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Note that v(T ) = n and
x(T ) = xchall = n − 1. Then, consider the vector z such that zchall = xchall = n − 1 and
zq =
1
n
> xq = 0 for each q ∈ T with q 6= chall, and observe that z(T ) = v(T ). Eventually,
since T ∩ S = ∅, (z, T ) is a counterobjection to any objection of p against chall through S.
Property 6.4.(3). No player different from chall has a justified objection against sat.
Suppose that a player p 6= chall has an objection (y, S) against sat to x. Since sat 6∈ S,
it is the case that {chall, sat} 6⊆ S and hence, by Lemma 6.3.(A), that v(S) ≤ m. Then,
we claim that (z, {sat, chall}) is a counterobjection to (y, S) of p against sat, where z is
a feasible distribution that assigns m to sat and w({chall, sat}) − m to chall. In fact, by
Lemma 6.3.(B), chall receives a payoff strictly greater than m (i.e., zchall > m). Then, note
that zsat = xsat and let us distinguish two cases.
In the case where chall 6∈ S, we have that zchall > m ≥ n− 1 = xchall (recall that m ≥ 2× n,
by Lemma 6.3.(D)). Instead, in the case where chall ∈ S, we have that zchall > m while
ychall ≤ v(S) ≤ m, and hence zchall > ychall. It follows that in both cases (z, {sat, chall}) is
a counterobjection to (y, S).
In the light of the properties above, we can limit our attention to the objections of chall against
sat. Consider an objection (y, S) of chall against sat to x. In particular, ychall must be greater
than xchall = n− 1 and yq > 0 = xq for each q ∈ S with q 6= chall. Thus, y(S) = v(S) > n− 1.
Then, because of Lemma 6.3.(C), in order for such a coalition S to be such that v(S) > n−1, no
penalty edge must be covered by S. Moreover, given that chall ∈ S, we have that S must contain
exactly one player per universally quantified variable so that v(S) = n > n−1, i.e., |S| = n+1 and
|S ∩ {αk,i(k),¬αk,¯i(k)}| = 1, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n. By this, the objection y has to be a vector such
that y(S) = n, ychall > n− 1, and yq > 0, for each q ∈ S with q 6= chall. Note that the coalition S
encodes an assignment σS for the variables in α such that αk evaluates to false (resp., true) in σS if
αk,i(k) (resp., ¬αk,¯i(k)) occurs in S—note that in this correspondence the truth values are inverted
with respect to the membership of the corresponding literal players in S.
Moreover, note that for each truth assignment σ for the variables in α, we may immediately
build a coalition S and a vector y such that (y, S) is an objection of chall against sat, and σS =
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σ. Therefore, objections of chall against sat are in correspondence with truth assignments for
universally quantified variables.
We are now ready to show that Φ is valid if and only if x is in B(BS(Φ)):
(⇒) Assume that Φ = (∀α)(∃β)φ(α,β) is valid, and let (y, S) be any objection of chall against
sat to x. We show that this objection is not justified, because sat has a counterobjection
(z, T ). Recall first that S encodes an assignment σS over the variables in α. Then, let σ be a
satisfying assignment over the variables in Φ such that αk evaluates to true in σ if and only if
it evaluates to true in σS ; indeed, such a satisfying assignment σ exists since Φ is valid. Based
on σ, let us construct the coalition T such that T ⊆ {sat} ∪ {ℓi,j | ℓi evaluates to true in σ ∧
cj is a clause where ℓi occurs} ∪ {c1, . . . , cm}, T ∩ S = ∅, |T | = 2m + 1, and v(T ) = m. In
particular, T can be such that v(T ) = m, precisely because σ is a satisfying assignment and
by construction of σS. Moreover, consider the vector z such that zsat = v(T ) = xsat = m and
zq = xq = 0 for each q ∈ T with q 6= sat (and, hence, q 6∈ S). By construction (z, T ) is a
counterobjection to (y, S), which is therefore not justified in its turn.
(⇐) Let σ be an assignment over the variables in α witnessing that Φ is not valid. Let (y, S)
be an arbitrary objection of chall against sat to x such that σS = σ. We claim that (y, S)
is justified. Indeed, assume for the sake of contradiction that (y, S) is not justified and let
(z, T ) be a counterobjection. Since sat ∈ T \ S and since we must have zsat ≥ xsat = m,
because of Lemma 6.3.(A) we actually have that zsat = xsat. In fact, since m is the maximum
available payoff over all the coalitions not including both chall and sat, z(T ) = v(T ) = m
and the fact that (z, T ) is a counterobjection to (y, S) together entail that S ∩ T = ∅. Also,
these entail that T contains all clause players, exactly one literal player per clause, so that
|T | = 2m+1. Observe now that T encodes a satisfying truth value assignment σT for φ(α,β),
because v(T ) > 0 and hence T does not cover any penalty edge. More precisely, we let each
variable γi (either γi = αi or γi = βi) to evaluate true (resp., false) in σT if γi,j (resp., ¬γi,j)
occurs in T , for some clause cj . Let σ
α
T denote the restriction of σT over the variables in α.
Then, since S ∩ T = ∅ and given the definition of σS , we have that σS = σ
α
T . Clearly, this
contradicts the fact that σ = σS witnesses that Φ is not valid.
Again, by the same argument used for the proof of Proposition 4.3, the above result extends to
compact representations more expressive than graph games.
Corollary 6.5. Let R be any compact representation such that GG -e R (e.g., R = MCN ). On
the class C(R), BargainingSet-Check is ΠP
2
-hard.
6.2 Membership on FNP Representation Schemes
As for the result pertaining checking whether a payoff vector belongs to the bargaining set, it has
already been argued by Deng and Papadimitriou that this problem is in ΠP
2
for graph games [3].
Indeed, they observed that one may decide that an imputation x is not in the bargaining set by
firstly guessing in NP the objection (y, S), and then by calling a co-NP oracle, through which
to check that there is no counterobjection (z, T ) to (y, S). However, to apply this argument one
typically assumes to consider real values with fixed-precision (or it should be proven that there
always exist suitable objections and counterobjections that may be guessed in polynomial-time).
Our main achievement in this section is to show that membership in ΠP
2
can be established,
independently of the precision adopted to represent the real values of interest in the game. To this
end, we shall provide a useful characterization of a player i having a justified objection against
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some player j. The result is in the spirit of one of Maschler [32]’s and connects the existence of
a justified objection of i against j to some algebraic conditions to hold on coalitions that i and j
(may) belong to.
Lemma 6.6. Let G be a coalitional game, and let x be an imputation of G. Then, player i has a
justified objection against player j to x through coalition S ∈ Ii,j if and only if there exists a vector
y ∈ RS such that:
(1) y(S) = v(S);
(2) yk > xk, for each k ∈ S; and,
(3) v(T ) < y(T ∩ S) + x(T \ S), for each T ∈ Ij,i.
Proof.
(⇒) Assume that player i has a justified objection against player j to x through coalition S ∈ Ii,j.
Let (y, S) be such justified objection and note that, by definition, y(S) = v(S) and yk > xk
for each k ∈ S hold. Assume now, for the sake of contradiction, that (3) above does not hold.
Let T¯ ∈ Ij,i be such that v(T¯ ) ≥ y(T¯ ∩ S) + x(T¯ \ S). Based on T¯ , let us build a vector
z ∈ RT¯ such that: (i) zk = xk + δ for each k ∈ T¯ \S; and, (ii) zk = yk + δ for each k ∈ T¯ ∩S,
where
δ =
v(T¯ )− y(T¯ ∩ S)− x(T¯ \ S)
|T¯ |
≥ 0.
Note that z(T¯ ) = v(T¯ ) holds by construction. Hence, (z, T¯ ) is a counterobjection to (y, S), a
contradiction.
(⇐) Assume that there is a vector y ∈ RS such that all the three conditions above hold. Consider
the pair (y, S) (with S ∈ Ii,j) and note that due to (1) and (2), (y, S) is in fact an objection
of player i against player j. We now claim that (y, S) is justified. Indeed assume, for the sake
of contradiction, that a counterobjection (z, T¯ ) (with T¯ ∈ Ij,i) exists such that: z(T¯ ) = v(T¯ ),
zk ≥ xk for each k ∈ T¯ \ S, and zk ≥ yk for each k ∈ T¯ ∩ S. In this case, it holds that
v(T¯ ) = z(T¯ ) ≥ y(T ∩ S) + x(T \ S), which contradicts (3).
Theorem 6.7. Let R be a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation. On the class
C(R), BargainingSet-Check is feasible in ΠP
2
.
Proof. Let G ∈ C(R) be a coalitional game, and x be a payoff vector. W.l.o.g., we assume that x
is an imputation, since checking this condition is feasible in ΠP
2
(see the proof of Theorem 5.6).
Consider the complementary problem of deciding whether x 6∈ B(G). We are going to show
that this is feasible in ΣP
2
. In the light of Lemma 6.6, x 6∈ B(G) if and only if there exist two
players i and j, and a coalition S ∈ Ii,j such that the set
W (i, j, S) = {y ∈ RS |y(S) = vR(ξR(G), S)∧
yk > xk, ∀k ∈ S∧
vR(ξR(G), T ) < y(T ∩ S) + x(T \ S), ∀T ∈ Ij,i}
is not empty. Thus, the problem can be solved by guessing in NP the players i and j and the set
S ∈ Ii,j, and then by asking an NP oracle to decide whether W (i, j, S) is empty or not. In the
latter case, we conclude that x 6∈ B(G).
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In order to show that this set is empty, the NP oracle may proceed as follows: it guesses at
most m ≤ |S|+1 coalitions T1, . . . Tm ∈ Ij,i, plus their worth values w1, . . . , wm, and the associated
certificates to check that actually 〈(ξR(G), Tℓ), wℓ〉 ∈ graph(v
R), ∀1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m. Moreover, it
guesses the worth value vR(ξR(G), S) and a suitable certificate cS for it. Then, by exploiting these
certificates, the oracle checks in (deterministic) polynomial time that all guessed worth values
are correct, as well as that the coalitions T1, . . . , Tm belongs to Ij,i and that S belongs to Ii,j.
Moreover, it computes the inequalities defined by the first two rows in the above expression, plus
the inequalities associated with the guessed coalitions T1, . . . , Tm ∈ Ij,i. Finally, it checks in
(deterministic) polynomial time whether this sub-system of at most 2(|S|+1) ≤ 2n inequalities has
some solution or not. In the latter case the oracle accepts, that is, it answers that W (i, j, S) = ∅.
To see that this procedure is correct, note that W (i, j, S) is defined by the intersection of a
finite number of convex regions of RS and hence, by Proposition 4.4 (Helly’s theorem), if W (i, j, S)
is empty then there exist a set E including (at most) |S| + 1 of its defining convex regions (here,
inequalities) witnessing its emptiness. Therefore, if this is the case, there exists some accepting
computation of the oracle where the inequalities associated with the m ≤ |S|+1 guessed coalitions
plus the |S|+ 1 inequalities associated with the first two rows of the above expression includes E ,
and thus the considered sub-system of inequalities has no solutions and it is a (succinct) witness
that W (i, j, S) = ∅.
From this result and Corollary 6.5, we immediately get the following completeness result.
Corollary 6.8. Let R be any non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation such that
GG -e R (e.g., R =MCN ). On the class C(R), BargainingSet-Check is Π
P
2
-complete.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided a complete picture of the complexity issues arising with the notions
of core, kernel, and bargaining set on compactly specified coalitional games. On the one hand,
we have exhibited membership results that apply to any arbitrary NP representation scheme for
coalitional games. On the other hand, the corresponding hardness results have been proven on the
setting of graph games (which is a very simple P representation scheme); hence, these hardness
results apply to marginal contribution networks and to any representation scheme that is at least
as expressive as graph games. Our results confirmed two conjectures by Deng and Papadimitriou
[3], and positively answer an open question posed by Ieong and Shoham [6].
Since the three analyzed solutions concepts turned out to be computationally intractable in
general, it is worthwhile looking for natural and expressive enough classes of games where these
solutions concepts can be efficiently computed. This question has received only partial answers so
far. It has been shown, by Ieong and Shoham [6], that deciding core non-emptiness and deciding
whether a payoff vector belongs to the core are problems feasible in polynomial time on classes of
marginal contribution networks having bounded treewidth. In this paper, we have further explored
this avenue of research, by showing the tractability of the kernel over graph games having bounded
treewidth. However, the tractability frontier for such solution concepts is far from being completely
charted. In particular, it remains an open problem to establish whether the kernel remains tractable
on classes of marginal contribution networks having bounded treewidth, and whether the bounded
treewidth is also the key for establishing tractability results when the bargaining set is considered.
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